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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I build on the assumption that collective emotional experience plays an
important role in sustaining the group identity central to nation-making processes inspired by
charismatic leaders. Through a case study of the Venezuelan government after the death of Hugo
Chávez, I will examine ways in which elements of the leader’s narrative are used by his successors
after his death. I argue that the current political actors of the bureaucratized Revolutionary
Government of Venezuela are attempting to sustain popular support by reaffirming a national
identity that resonated among the masses largely due to the charisma of a now absent leader, Hugo
Chávez. I wish to explore the probability or lack thereof of a sustained emotional connection of
the government regime with the mass audience.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this paper, I build on the assumption that collective emotional experience plays an
important role in sustaining the group identity central to nation-making processes inspired by
charismatic leaders. This analysis is based on a case study of the Venezuelan government after the
death of Hugo Chávez. I examine ways in which elements of the leader’s narrative are used by his
successors after his death. I also argue that the current political actors of the bureaucratized
Revolutionary Government of Venezuela are attempting to sustain popular support by reaffirming
a national identity that resonated among the masses largely due to the charisma of a now absent
leader. I wish to explore the probability or lack thereof of a sustained emotional connection of the
government regime with the mass audience.
More specifically, I will analyze the use of anti-American narrative, in the post-Chávez
Venezuela, by new political actors. I am interested in studying the possibilities and limits of this
narrative as a tool to access the power of mass emotional attachment (Shamir et al. 1993). To that
end, the empirical question I wish to address is: To what extent can bureaucratic actors rely on the
former leader’s rhetoric to influence mass audiences? In other words, can the use of his rhetoric
suffice to sustain the “symbolic interaction” (Blumer 1986 [1969]; Mead 2009 [1934]; Weber 2002
[1904]; Zerubavel 1999) that he established with his followers? My theoretical framework
involves two main theories—symbolic codes and narrative—in order to observe what influences
the effectiveness of a given symbolic code in official government narratives.
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Symbolic Code
This study is one of many others that support the notion that symbolic codes are socially
created (Swidler 1986; Wood and Rennie 1994; Clark 1997; Brader 2005; Altheide 2002; Van
Dijk 1998). Swidler (1995) prefers the term “semiotic code,” which she describes as “deeply held,
inescapable relationships of meaning that define the possibilities of utterance in a cultural
universe” (1995:32). For the cognitive sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel, symbols are the product of
our “semiotic socialization”; through social convention, a specific “signifier” is attributed to the
representation of a specific “signified” (1999:71). The central focus of this study is how
Venezuelan state officials have accentuated a particular system of meaning for their audiences,
“the United States as a villain.” The highly televised nation-making process, originally led by
Hugo Chávez (Muñoz 2008; Silva-Ferrer 2013; Duno Gottberg, 2004), has repeatedly reproduced
the story of a possible US intervention in Venezuela, thus attributing to the signifier of the US the
signified of a villain.
Zerubavel argues that “when we regard something as a symbol, we are primarily concerned
with what it represents, to the point where what it actually ‘means’ sometimes overrides any
functional significance it may otherwise have for us” (1999:68). In the government’s narrative, the
US functions not as a country but as an actor in a symbolic war. It is used as symbolic evidence of
danger, reaching a social meaning of menace, from which Venezuelans and others around the
globe need to protect themselves.
This assumed shared meaning of the US is not, however, just a natural sociomental
association. Zerubavel makes a distinction between symbols and indicators to demonstrate how
symbolic associations are not a natural process but are instead the product of conventionality
(1999:70), unlike indicators, which are intrinsic to the signifier. For Zerubavel indicators are
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inevitable consequences of which the signifier shows physical evidence whereas symbols, on the
other hand, “do not presuppose any physical affinity whatsoever between the signifier and what it
is supposed to represent to us. … Of all the signs we use, the mental association between signifier
and signified is the least inevitable in symbols” (Zerubavel 1999:71). Zerubavel uses medical
examples to speak of indicators. A symptom of an illness would thus be an indicator, not a symbol.
In the Venezuelan case, it must be taken into account that the condition of the US as a
villain has been constructed with historical or foreign references, more so than with physical proof.
The villainous condition of the US in Venezuela is more based on experiences of US actions in
other countries than in Venezuela itself. There are notorious cases where US involvement has been
publically proven with very concrete material evidence, an example of that are the files called
"Operation PBSUCCESS," released in 1997 which contained assassination instructions and
evidence of training camps and financial investment for the Coup d’Etat of 1954 in Guatemala
(Valdés-Ugalde 2004). However, in the case of Venezuela, the investigative work around the
participation of the US in the coup of 2002 (Golinger 2005; Villegas 2009) has not been able to
provide sufficient material proof that can serve as an indicator of the foreign involvement, leaving
this notion of potential US intervention at the symbolic level, that is, mainly based on historical
facts as opposed to current local affairs.
Another consideration for this analysis is that the meaning of a symbol derives from its
opposition to, or contrast with, other symbols, more so than from its relation to its signifier,
consequently part of this analysis focuses on observing these relationships. Understanding the
construction of a symbolic villain requires understanding its contrast with the symbolic hero and
the symbolic victim. The data shows how the US is presented by the interviewers and interviewee
as a villain in contrast to its victims, which are peoples from all around the world. The heroes are
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the people of Venezuela, represented by Chavez who was brave and strong enough to liberate them
from oppression. A fourth category is associated with the villain, which is the category of the fools.
Klapp argues that “The relationship of hero, villain and fool types is perhaps best
understood by considering them as kinds of deviance from a normative center of conventional
conduct [and that] the three directions of deviation might be described as (1) better than, (2) falling
short of, or (3) antagonism to the standards required of all group members” (1954:57).
The image of Chavez serves to build the symbol of the Venezuelan people as heroes in the
battle. And they alone, in contrast to other symbolic victims and the fools (the Venezuelans who
support the US), carry the legacy of a true revolutionary leader who was not afraid to confront the
hegemonic villain. The US villain is by no means exclusive to Venezuela, as mentioned before. In
Mexico, the term “Colosuss of the North” was a popular name given to the northern nation and
associated with Porfirio Diaz’s famous quote “Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the
United States” (Valdés-Ugalde 2004).
It is clear that the symbolic code of the American villain has a long history in Latin
America, and that it stems from old policy decisions of the US regarding its southern neighbours.
Interventionist policies dating back to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 are behind this socially
circulating system of meaning. The Cold War interventions of the US in Latin America were
extensively documented, as shown in the example of Guatemala, where US state funds were
clearly linked to military coups and widespread human rights violations throughout the region
(Ferreira Navarro 2014; Valdés-Ugalde 2004).
This system of meaning has been a pivotal “symbolic code” (Loseke 2010:30) in the
political narrative of the Chavista government, in spite of the fact that no specific actions have
been materially demonstrated. It can be added that “symbolic codes are complex systems of ideas
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about how the world works, how it should work, and of the rights and responsibilities of people in
the world” (Loseke 2009:498) and that in the case of Venezuela, the US villain was an affective
political narrative tool used by Chavez to gain international popularity.

Narrative, Persuasion, and Emotion
Central to my analysis is the understanding of narrative as a means to social action, identity
building, and collective memory construction. Language acts in narrative as a symbolic system of
signification (Zerubavel 1999). Cultural meaning systems are “often embedded in and spread
through socially circulating narratives [containing] shared cognitive, emotional, and moral
meanings” (Kusenbach and Loseke 2013:23).
In Latin America, the image of the US as a villain is widespread. It constitutes a socially
circulating narrative that has traditionally been used by counterhegemonic movements in the
region (Ferreira Navarro 2014). It can be considered part of what Mills called a “vocabulary of
motives” (Mills 1940), whereby linguistic structures are used to persuade movement members to
undertake action (Benford 1993). In the current narrative of the Venezuelan state, it constitutes a
fundamental aspect of what Zeruvabel would call a “historical narrative.” “By defining a certain
moment in history as the actual beginning of a particular historical narrative, it implicitly defines
for us everything that preceded that moment as mere ‘pre-history’ which we can practically forget”
(1999:68).
I am interested in empirically assessing some of the mechanisms used to construct a
vocabulary of motives using “prototypical characters” (Loseke 2012:256). I will explore which
types of people derive from these prototypical characters. Stories of US interventions construct the
plot of a second period of colonization, underscoring the heroic condition of Bolivarian
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Revolutionaries. Formerly oppressed victims have turned into emancipated warriors against an
external villain supported by malicious internal allies (government opponents).
This semiotic socialization has been based on the connection through narrative and
storytelling between the “symbolic code” of the villain and the “emotion code” of hate. As cultural
ways of feeling, emotion codes are “sets of ideas about what emotions are appropriate to feel when,
where, and toward whom or what, as well as how, they should be outwardly expressed” (Loseke
2009:498). Similarly, Hochschild (1983) used the term “feeling rules” to refer to the ways people
view their actions in relation to emotional conventions.
The observation that social groups have systems of meanings identifying certain emotions
as “appropriate” suggests that a group will judge the identification and loyalty of its members in
terms of the degree to which their emotional expressions conform to the code. As Turner and Stets
argue, one of the signs that demonstrate obedience to the code is people’s employment of “the
appropriate emotional vocabularies and syntax to convince both themselves and others that they
are indeed abiding by feeling rules” (2006:26). In other words, those who are seen as truly part of
the group will be those whose outward expressions clearly reveal that their inner emotional
responses are in line with the code.
In part, this study responds to the argument made by Kusenbach and Loseke about the fact
that, despite the long history of recognition that emotions are critical to social life, research on the
topic would benefit from more qualitative empirical analysis (Kusenbach and Loseke 2013). They
point to the general tendency to focus on the subjective emotional experience of individuals,
leaving a need for more conceptual tools to operationalize processes of meaning making in
collective emotional experience.
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Kusenbach and Loseke propose that emotions themselves can constitute socially
identifiable systems of meaning. They argue that qualitative studies of collective emotional
experience, including “mass convergence in emotional experiences” (2013:23), is thus enhanced
by asking questions about the historical, cultural, and political contexts and antecedents of such
experiences. This empirical analysis addresses the emotional vocabularies and syntax in the current
rhetoric of the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela to better understand its systems of meaning.
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HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS

The television broadcast that constitutes the central object of study in this paper took place
two years after the death of Hugo Chávez, the undisputed leader of the Bolivarian Revolution in
Venezuela. The symbolic code used as the axis of the program is that of the US villain.
The same day of the telecast, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, had issued
an “Executive Order (E.O.) declaring a national emergency with respect to the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the
situation in Venezuela.”1 The targeted sanctions in the E.O. implement the Venezuela Defense of
Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014. The Executive Order imposed sanctions on seven
specific individuals whom the White House deemed corrupt. The sanctions were to freeze the
assets of these individuals within US jurisdiction, to prohibit US citizens from conducting
transactions with such assets, 2 and to suspend the sanctioned individuals’ entry to the United
States.3 However, the language used in the Executive Order was capitalized on by Venezuelan
state officials and the telecast’s conductors in this case as well, to reinforce the symbolic code of
US villain.
Aside from emotion codes attributed to the symbolic code of the US villain, emotion codes
referenced in the broadcast also refer to two main groups: Chavistas and escúalidos, that is, those

1

Downloaded
from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/09/fact-sheet-venezuelaexecutive-order on May 28, 2016
2
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1132.aspx
3
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm
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who support the government and those who do not. To understand these references, it is important
to understand the immediate “pre-history” of the Bolivarian Revolution and the use of national
television broadcasting by Chávez himself.
Acosta-Alzuru (2014) argues that in Venezuela political polarization defines national life,
altered and embodied in part by the complex relationship between the revolutionary government
and the media, where the terms Chavistas and escúalidos were born and grew strong.
The connection between a charismatic leader and his audience occurs when he manages to
change people’s expectations of what is and what is not possible through demonstrations of his
personal extraordinariness (Turner 1993, 2003, 2011). The leader’s exceptionality is seen as a sort
of magic and a compelling force that enables personal transformations in people who become
obedient followers. A leader who takes risks that would not normally be regarded as possible and
manages to succeed changes the parameters of risk. The “eternal commander,” as he has been
posthumously called through government-funded propaganda campaigns, was an outspoken
detractor of US imperialism, neoliberal economic policies and Venezuelan local elites. His antihegemonic bellicose rhetoric gained much international support for. He became a hero, offering a
world of new possibilities through the symbolic interaction embodied by the revolutionary process.
His followers were able to see themselves as co-protagonists of a new order.
Chávez first became known for leading an attempted coup d’état against president Carlos
Andrés Pérez in 1992. He was jailed after this event and released two years later. He founded a
party called the “Fifth Republic” and was seen by voters as an alternative to the political order (the
fourth republic, which I argue is framed as the “pre-history”) that had been in place in Venezuela
since 1958. He ran an aggressive campaign that was broadly supported by various leftist political
parties including the three major ones: the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), founded in 1931;
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the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), founded in 1983; and the People’s Electoral Movement
(MEP), founded in 1967. As it became apparent that anger against the established political order
was coalescing around Chávez’s candidacy, the social democratic and Christian democratic
parties, AD and COPEI, which had been the principal protagonists of the preceding 40 years of
two-party democracy, joined together for the first time in support of a single candidate, in order to
have a chance of defeating Chávez.
Chávez criticized the progressively decomposing two-party democracy (Lupu 2010),
which he promised to abolish, along with corruption and poverty. Chávez projected himself as the
successor of Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelan who led the nineteenth-century war of independence
across northern South America. Humberto Jaimes argues that Chávez
stirred up the psyche of Venezuelans, opening old wounds that were sleeping in the
collective mind, so his [presidency] served as a sort of cultural and social purgative.
[…] The speeches of the commander reminded thousands of Venezuelans that they
are also a country of indigenous, mestizo and black people, and not a Caucasian
country; that Venezuela extends beyond the concrete towers of the metropolitan
area; […] that the lower classes must be treated with dignity. (2003:165)
Chávez won the 1998 election with an overwhelming 56.20% of the vote.4 The political
leader declared his election as the beginning of a Bolivarian Revolution, conceived as a process of
refounding the Republic. He stated that the revolution was to be carried out in phases, starting with
a constitutional assembly, followed by a phase of socioeconomic restructuring. Throughout both
of these phases, Chávez also argued that it was essential to construct a collective identity
(Harnecker 2005). National symbols, like the flag, the code of arms, and even the country’s name,
were modified (Alvarez 2006) to create visual and symbolic representations that could build a

4

http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/documentos/estadisticas/e006.pdf
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sense of solidarity among previously more detached constituencies, a common practice in nationmaking processes (Anderson 2006).
In his discourses, Chávez identified two very distinctive groups in Venezuelan society:
those who were part of the revolutionary process and those who were not. The revolutionaries were
presented in such a way that the self of the leader was discursively merged with the selves of his
followers. Together they became “the new man.” Chávez and his followers formed a communion
of thought, with the leader always at the forefront as the regulatory entity, delivering moral and
value judgments during weekly discourses on national television. Venezuelans had to be with or
against him. It was his idea of the self, expressed in various forms of identity constructions that
became the centerpiece of the political project. A consequence of this personalization was the
progressive increase in the use of the term “Chavista” to refer to the supporters of the revolution,
gradually replacing most other terms.
Chávez used many terms to identify the opposition, including “oligarchs,” “fascists,”
“terrorists,” and “traitors” (Bolívar 2015). In 2002, when the opposition organized massive street
demonstrations against the regime, he began to use the term “escuálidos,” which literally means
both very dirty and very emaciated. Chávez said the opposition demonstrators looked “esquálidos”
because they weren’t happy; they had no color, nor strength, nor any clear direction—as opposed
to his followers, who were just the opposite, the anti-imperialist heroes. He then began to use the
term to designate the organized opposition as a whole as well as any person who did not share his
political ideas (Sanz 2004: 61).
As pointed out by Frajman (2014), while Chávez was in power, he and his team made
intensive use of television to maintain the personal connection between the president and the
people. They used a program called Aló Presidente (Aló is the Spanish word for saying hello over
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the phone) as a central element in their media strategy. A total of 378 shows with an average
duration of 5 to 6 hours were aired on Sundays between 1999 and 2012. This is important because
these shows set a precedent for political propaganda in the region which the show analyzed in this
study stems from. In these shows, Chávez was the center of attention. He spoke directly to people
who, in the early shows, would call on the phone. Chávez called them by their first name and
discussed their requests. The leader spoke of Venezuelan folk culture, making specific references
to daily matters and cultural heritage in all areas, from food to music. Snow and Benford
(1992:141) argue that “the frame strikes a responsive chord in that it rings true with extant beliefs,
myths, folktales and the like.” Chávez indeed stressed the need to understand one’s own history
and placed himself as one of Venezuela’s historical figures, by claiming to be both reenacting
Simón Bolívar’s political ideals and representing the long-awaited change for the Venezuelan
people. Chávez intertwined an anti-status-quo rhetoric with a familiar tone, frequently using
colloquialisms and personal stories.
Kirk Hawkins (2010) claims that what Chávez wished to transmit was more profound and
less specific than just an ideology, that is, a more unconscious cosmovision.5 Given the type of
content of the show and the Goffmanian presentation of self that Chávez performed, it is relevant
to look at the structure of his TV show to recognize its influence on the new Venezuelan political
narrative. Frajman has described the structure of Aló Presidente as follows:
At first it was primarily a phone-in show that allowed individuals to speak to the
leader, and focused on highlighting the government’s achievements. Media
professionals mediated the exchanges on air. Gradually, particularly following the
attempted coup against Chávez in 2002, the emphasis turned more to the image of

5

Wilhelm von Humboldt used the term cosmovision to describe a way of looking a the world, one that was
not necessarily reflective yet always intuitive, encompassing the values and intuition of peoples, nations, and cultural
groups and containing the essential character of language and spirituality or that which was metaphysical (Santiago
2011).
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the leader, and his interaction with his followers became more unmediated. Crowds
around the set began to be the norm, with many of those present becoming the
beneficiaries of the government’s largesse on national television. (2014:504)
However, what at the beginning had been a show displaying a man conducting a revolution
for the people and with the people gradually became the story of the man himself and of the great
achievements of the revolution. Frajman suggests that the show was used to “shape the political
debate, to publicize the accomplishments of Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution, to attack the
opposition and make surprising announcements, and to strengthen the bond between leader and
followers” (2014:503), and I would add that asserting Chávez’s authority was also of great
importance. Chávez presentation of self was that of a leader, a religious figure, a father, and a man
with the regulatory moral values that all revolutionaries were expected to follow (Zúquete 2008).
Chávez conducted the symbolic socialization process within the Revolution. He used very strong
insults against his enemies, told educational tales, held personal conversations with his guests,
callers, or members of the audience present at the set. Chávez gave lessons, clarified ideological
concepts, discussed international and national affairs, and very often gave orders and reprimanded
his team members as a father would his children, calling them by their names or even nicknames
and reprimanding them on the air.
Chávez spoke of moral virtue and a fight against the evil forces of the Venezuelan political
past, always aided by US imperialism. When scandals involving members of his team were made
public, Chávez would reprimand them on the TV show, asserting his role the moral leader.
Chávez won the 2012 elections (his fourth reelection) and died soon thereafter, leaving a
void in the power structure that could be solved only by a new electoral process. Article 233 of
Chávez’s 1999 Constitution, states, “Pending election and inauguration of the new President, the
President of the National Assembly shall take charge of the Presidency of the Republic.” However,
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Diosdado Cabello, president of the Assembly at the time and until December 2015, was not
appointed, and instead, Nicolas Maduro, who was endorsed by Chávez, was.
The narrative analysis conducted herein aims at examining the stories told by current
government officials in the bureaucratized post-Chávez Venezuela. This is a close examination of
one specific and most relevant sample: an interview with Roy Chaderton, a former Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Venezuela who, at the time of the broadcast, was the Venezuelan Ambassador
to the Organization of American States (OAS). The interview was broadcast as the central part of
a television program called Zurda Konducta on March 9, 2015, two years after the death of Hugo
Chávez.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Analytic Method
The original data for this analysis is in the form of a two-hour video currently available on
YouTube. 6 The 2-hour telecast contains in its first hour an interview with Chancelor Roy
Chaderton, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Venezuela who, at the time of the broadcast,
was the Venezuelan Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS). The interview
was broadcast as the central part of a television program called Zurda Konducta on March 9, 2015,
two years after the death of Hugo Chávez.
This 11:00 p.m. broadcast, was transmitted on the Venezuelan National Television Station.
The verbatim translation of the TV show had diminishing returns, so I selectively transcribed
portions of interest, more specifically portions of the interview and the presenter’s introduction to
the interview. I did the transcription directly as a translation. The original audio is in Spanish, so I
translated as I transcribed the data. The total selection of the TV show that I transcribed had 12,227
words (as translated). Although I did not transcribe the entire telecast, I did go through the process
of listening to it in its entirety 12 times.
Only the following two elements were fully excluded from being transcribed and
translated:

1. The lyrics of the songs throughout the program. Most of the music of the program is
instrumental, and the few songs that do have lyrics compete with the voices of the

6

Accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEjDFyz5ui0 on June 4, 2015.
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speakers and it is extremely difficult to understand their content. It is possible to
determine that the few songs with lyrics (3 of them during the interview) are in Spanish
and belong to the new wave of Ibero-American rock.

2. The second hour of the program after the interview of Chancellor Chaderton. Although
these videos contained text that further reinforced the construction of the symbolic code
US villain, they mainly repeated the same contents commented during the interview.

Through a process of lumping and splitting (Zerubavel 1996), I organize the data into
conceptual categories, always keeping in mind those elements connecting the symbolic code of
the US villain with emotion codes, and the relationships between the different “types of people”
(Klapp 1954). I paid special attention to story telling and the roles of these types of people within
them. A an important focus of analysis was the identity construction evidenced in the descriptions
of these types of people and their roles, and their relationship with categories widely used by
Chavez himself, exemplified in the videos used in the introduction and closure of the program.
The symbolic interaction Chavez established with his followers through his warlike rhetoric and
historical references is copied in the rest of the program. The data analysis shows how the program
hosts frequently announce that they will follow Chavez’s lead. What I intend to explore is to what
extent the use of Chavez’s voice or style by new government officials and agents of propaganda
dissemination can influence the effectiveness of a symbolic code.

16

Relevance of Roy Chaderton to Venezuelan Foreign Policy
There are several reasons why this particular interview is a very significant example of the
current political discourse sustained by Venezuelan government officials:

1. The political relevance of Roy Chaderton to Venezuelan foreign policy
2. The significance of the TV program Zurda Konducta in the use of mass media by the
Bolivarian Revolution
3. The political timing of the broadcast, given the fact that that same there had been an
executive order again Venezuela issued by the US government.

Roy Chaderton is a lawyer, a politician, and a diplomat. He is a senior member of the
Venezuelan Diplomatic Service who, by the time Chávez came to power, had already served in
diplomatic missions in Poland, Germany, Belgium, and the United Nations for the governments
of the so-called fourth republic, during the period of biparty democratic governments prior to the
Bolivarian Revolution. He had also been, between 1985 and 2000, Ambassador to Gabon, Norway,
Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as Director General of International Policy. Chávez rose
to power in 1999, and Chaderton was then appointed Ambassador to Colombia. In 2002, he became
Minister of Foreign Relations, a position he held until 2004, and then he became Ambassador to
France from 2004 to 2007. In 2008, he was appointed Ambassador to Mexico as well as Permanent
Representative to the Organization of American States, where he served until 2015. At present,
Chaderton serves as deputy at the Latin American Parliament in Panama and has been appointed
to accompany the peace talks between the Colombian Government and the FARC. His most
current appointment is as the Director of International Affairs for the Partido Socialista Unido de
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Venezuela (PSUV), the official governing party, a position that grants him power as what VanDijk (1998) would call an “ideologist” in the government.
Chaderton is a crucial political figure because international affairs have been critically
important for the Bolivarian Revolution. Galbán and Molero de Cabeza (2008) speak of the
sacralization that Chávez proposed regarding his own role as a political leader in the domestic
arena and his heroic deeds in the international arena, where he gained respect by using very strong
language against the US. In this study, I analyze a similar rhetorical stance on the part of Roy
Chaderton. The use of irony by a senior member of a diplomatic body is especially significant in
this regard, since making pejorative remarks in public spaces without any apparent consequences
presumably adds to the construction of “heroes” of the resistance against the amplified threat of
the US enemy.

Significance of the TV Program Zurda Konducta
Zurda Konducta is a talk show where various political topics are discussed and where
political actors from the Chavista government are interviewed. In the 83 editions of the program
that are available on the show’s web page, all the political actors interviewed are supporters or
representatives of Chavismo. The show is broadcast on the state-owned television channel
Venezolana de Televisión (VTV). Chávez’s Sunday TV show Aló Presidente was also broadcast
on the same station.
Zurda Konducta does not imitate the format of Aló Presidente, the original political show
featured by Chavez himself. The hosts of Zurda Konducta, however, do use a similar type of
language as Chavez used and make references to similar topics (they use colloquial language and
anti-imperialist rhetoric, often with metaphors of war; personal storytelling is frequent; and they
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make constant references to historical events). VTV is the most important and widely broadcast
state-owned television channel, used regularly by the government for political propaganda.
I used the original location of the data excerpts in the YouTube video to mark which
segments are used. Excerpts are noted by indicating the minute in which they appear in the original
video. The 2-hour telecast contains motion graphics with a very modern aesthetic. The background
music is often hard rock, heavy metal, or electronic music. Three videos of Hugo Chávez are used
to introduce and close the program and constitute my first set of data. The second set is the
introduction by the commentators of the guests of the night, and the third is the interview with
Chaderton.
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DATA ANALYSIS

Melodrama and Symbolic Associations
A melodramatic narrative is one where emotions are elicited by clear distinctions between
what is good and what is evil (Anker 2014:23), but as Zerubavel (1999) posits, shared meanings
are not necessarily natural sociomental associations. Symbolic associations can be constructed
through language between signifiers and signifieds regardless of how unlikely the association
between them would be without the semiotic socialization. Associating symbolic and emotion
codes to shape roles of victims, heroes, and villains is essential to the construction of a
melodramatic narrative.
Rhetorical figures like irony (implying opposite meanings) and hyperbole (deliberate
exaggeration) are used in these data in ways that create a two-dimensional melodrama (Simons
2007). There is a semantic range of “us,” which is characterized by positive value and a semantic
range of “them,” characterized by demonization and clowning.
The program opens with two videos of Chávez speaking of resistance to power. One of the
videos is comment Chavez makes to the cameras in what seems to be a casual interview. The other
two, one used to open the show and the second one used to close the interview section of the show,
are video of political meetings where Chavez describes the imperial dominance of the US and the
strength for resistance of the Venezuelan people. In the first video, Chávez was standing alone
telling a personal story and looking directly at the camera. He narrates a story about wanting to
play the guitar since childhood and realizing, as an adult, that being left-handed made the task very
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difficult. He then declares that the right-handed people wish to rule the world and declares, “We
are here, the left-handed people are here, left-handed conduct, that’s it, left-handed conduct!”
(00:16). The right-handed people are the antagonists, the “them,” who wish to oppress all others.
Chávez uses the image of himself as a child to help shape the construction of the goodness of the
victim, which is typical of melodramatic tales (Anker 2014). By beginning the telecast with this
video, the antecedents for the Chavista moral worldview are established. “Us” means goodness,
art, culture, hope, a child with the desire to grow culturally, “them” means oppression.
The second video of Chavez continues to knit the moral ground. He speaks to a crowd of
people in a public meeting. This video narrows even more the melodramatic structure of the overall
narrative. A still shot of Chávez with his signature and the phrase “Chávez Forever” is the opening
image. A newscast from 2008 appears, with a ticker that reads, “Commander Chávez. In 72 hours
the US ambassador must abandon Venezuela.”
The video makes reference to a revolutionary promise of social resistance. The expulsion
of the US ambassador was being announced.7 Chávez says in the video:
(0:19) “If there were an aggression against the people of Venezuela, then there will
be no oil for the people or the government of the United States. Shitty Yankees,
you have to know that we have decided to be free, no matter what happens or how
much it costs us. It’s enough! It’s enough! Of so much shit from you Yankies. It’s
enough, It’s enough! Ojala8, as our Arab brothers say, Ojala, Inshala, As-salāmu
ʿalaykum9, ojala someday the people of the United States will have a government
with whom one can communicate, ojala, someday, son, sooner than later that
country may have a government that respects the people and the governments of
Latin America. We don’t ask them for anything more. Only that they respect us,
because we deserve respect. [the audience begins a chant that says, ‘like this, like
this, this is how you rule’ while moving their fists in the air] I expect, and I am not
going to ask the other governments to do the same that we do, no. Everyone is free,

7

Accessed at http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/17496/chavez-expulsa-al-embajador-de-eeuude-venezuela/ on January 4, 2015.
8
The Word Ojalá derives from the Arab Word Inshala, which means “God willing”
9
Arabic Muslim greeting that means “peace be with you”
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but…well, well, the day when all of us South Americans begin to sing like a single
rooster, they will respect us. Yes, they will respect us. That is the secret. The day
we speak with just one voice, we will be respected by the powerful of the world.
They have kept us divided. Each one defending their own interests. We don’t. We
defend and will always defend, the dignity of our people to the last consequences.”
This semiotic layer establishes the morally condemnable nature of Yankees, who are dangerous
and abusive but not to be feared by “us.” An “us” that includes other victims around the world
“our Arab brothers.” The symbolic code of the US is connected to the emotion code of anger by
Chávez. The program addresses the revolutionary commitment to social resistance in honor of the
everlasting ubiquitous leader who fought so hard for “us.” Resistance defines the position of
Chavistas as heroes, even in the absence of Chávez.
Chaderton tells a story of the US committing human rights crimes around the world based
on financial interests. He uses rhetorical figures like hyperbole, personification (treating the US as
a person), irony and metaphor. He makes emotional and physical references by using nouns like
“fondness” and “addiction.” Consider, for example, the following two examples characterizing the
United States (they)
(34:09) “They have a fondness and an addiction10 to war. They need war, because
war is a business. War means killing, on the one hand. But because it is not
profitable to resuscitate, because resuscitating has not yet been inventing,
reconstruction is the business. So reconstructing Iraq, for example [a silence is
made, he nods and then continues] Halliburton! A company of which Dick vicepresident of the US Cheney was president. They would sell to them from burgers
to boots to weapons or medical equipment…it is a war conceived to be a big
business”
(35:50) “…just think of the amount of deaths they caused in Guatemala, Salvador
or Colombia…everywhere, and then there are also the selective deaths, in the
senses that they are numerically less in countries like Uruguay and Brazil. So the
Barbarians of our time are the imperial governments. The empire is making a strong

10

The words used in Spanish are “afición” and “adicción” which have a similar sound , giving poetic rhythm
to the phrase
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effort to destroy the ‘bad’ example Venezuela is, because we have resisted for over
15 years”
The irony implied by the use of the term, “rescucitation,” ridicules “them.” Venezuelan is
portrayed as a heroic “us” that resists an empire’s desire to destroy a dangerous, brutal empire.
Several semiotic layers contextualize the melodramatic plot constructed in this telecast of
Zurda Konducta. Perhaps the most relevant element is the framing of the communicational
instance within a “morally polarizing worldview” (Anker 2014).
Although melodrama has traditionally been associated with moral conservatism, the
political left has also made extensive use of the genre (Gerould 1994). In this case, for instance,
the blame for world oppression of the minorities, “the left-handed” is placed on the leaders of the
“right-handed,” The United States. The people of Venezuela, the “us,” are strong and willing
enough to resist this powerful enemy because Chávez redeemed them. The melodrama is not just
about a pure but courageous victim and an evil enemy, but also about the loss of physical man
turned into a deity by death, The eternal commander, as he has been posthumously called through
government-funded propaganda campaigns. Chávez acts as the prototypical character (Loseke
2012) after which the heroes of the story are shaped.
In the interview, consonant with Gerould’s (1994) concept of the melodrama of the left,
Chancellor Chaderton victimizes Venezuela but also attributes to it a capacity for resistance to a
great enemy. Chaderton says:
(36:31) “The great disruptor is the empire. They cause problems everywhere; they
cause tragedies, death, the destruction of countries. Libya, for example, could have
been a hard country, but there, everyone could eat, everyone had access to
education, the country was unified, in the midst of a tribal culture which could have
caused serious problems. However, Gaddafi’s iron hand kept the country united.
Today the country is mostly dominated by the Islamic State, which is a creature of
the United States, like Al-Qaeda was their creature too.”
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These lines come after a discussion commentator and interviewee have over the existence of an
international media protection of the US. One of the program hosts had asked a question about the
“media axis” (36:20) “A question about the media axis, Madrid, Miami, Mexico, Peru against
Venezuela…” Charderton interrupts and says: (36:56) “Do not forget Santiago in Chile, there is
where the ati-chavista left resides” another host asks: (37:02) “Do they publish the same kind of
information about human rights violations in the United States as is published against Venezuela?”
Chaderton then answers: (37:17) “No because it is understood that those incidents that occur in
the Unieted States are not the responsibility of the system but radam acts by deviant individuals”
By mentioning the Human Rights violations of the United States that will not be covered by the
international press, Chaderton is denouncing the extensive media coverage of the human rights
violations of the Venezuelan government during the student protests of 2014. This is not explicitly
said, but the political timing of the interview coincides with the questioning of the repression the
government exercised against the student protests a year before in Venezuela. Speaking of the
iron-hand of Gaddafi as the unifying factor of a people in this context implies that perhaps the
oppression of the students in 2014 was, after all, simply necessary for the greater good.
In sum, anti-imperialism is the moral value of the Venezuelan government, the leaders of
the true heroes, the Chavistas. An evil enemy seeks to destroy Venezuelans, and there are many
other economic powers that support the evil US, and its creation of monsters like Al Qeada. This
is a melodramatic construction of a clear division between the evil “them” and the impeccably
good “us.”
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Types of People
A melodramatic narrative throughout the interview has established who are the villains and
the heroes, but the entire production and design of this program is also part of the bureaucratized
Revolutionary Government of Venezuela. This is national television and from it an active attempt
is daily reinforced to sustain popular support by reaffirming a national identity largely built on the
discursive legacy of a now absent leader, Hugo Chávez, who is the prototypical hero. Even though
this program is about the sanctions by the US of seven individuals, the story of these specific
individuals is not told, since they would not reinforce the prototype of a hero. They were sanctioned
for acts of corruption. The story of Venezuela’s achievements in terms of social development as a
result of the revolution’s emancipation is not told either, because the socioeconomic crisis at the
time of the interview would not help either the reinforcement of the hero prototype. Only the
evilness of the US is described, and its allies and victims around the world are referenced. The
symbolic code of a villain in relation to its victims and allies is the resource that is left to construct
the prototype of the hero.
The “eternal commander” works as the main prototype character. He acts as a powerful
outspoken and now ubiquitous detractor of imperialism. The US, represented by Obama (as
excerpts of the telecast analyzed further down will show), as the prototypical character, are the
evil murderers in the name of neoliberalism. Venezuelan local elites and international media are
the allies, the enemies that are in some cases powerful and in some cases fools.
The stories told so far imply that Chávez is good, morally superior, and an authority figure,
while his opponents are evil and need to be stopped. The main conductor of the program makes a
linkage from the very introduction of the show between the program’s narrative and that of Chávez.
The conductor says that the program is truthful and implies that it is also rebellious, in the image
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and likeness of the late leader: “you are welcome to the only program that does not do audiovisual
speculation” (03:20), which attests to the good and truthful nature of the program’s intentions. He
then adds, “We begin with the left hand, with Chávez’ left hand.” By saying this, he states that he
will act as Chávez would. This last phrase “with Chávez’ left hand” is repeated four more times
by the conductors throughout the program.
Our perception of the world is influenced by our socially constructed preconceptions, some
of which may be individual, but most are unquestionably social (Zeruvabel 1999). The idea of
“acting as Chávez would” is a clear example of a socially constructed preconception. Chávez
represents a way of perceiving the world. A Chávez type of person is morally sound and
courageous. A Yankee type of person is abusive and dangerous.
From the introductory segments of the data, what Goffman would call the “platform
format” is established. A platform format is the arrangement that constitutes “the set up to convey
an activity to a given audience” (1983:17). Both the videos and the conductor’s introduction serve
to delimit both the melodramatic plot and the types of people in the tale.
The US is cruel and vicious. The conductor of the program announces that the program
will address
(03:57). “the Manichaeism and imperial madness, the need to generate conflict
everywhere, of transporting conflict everywhere, although they [the US], internally,
erode human rights and have a population subjugated to an economic crisis while
doing everything to try to lower oil prices so countries like Russia, like Iran or
Venezuela end up incapable of fulfilling economic obligations with the US people”
Symbolic codes and emotion codes are combined here to develop a type of person (Loseke 2012).
Three main types of people are established in the the data: (1) the US villain, (3) the Chavistas,
who the heroes, (2) the victims, who are the people of Venezuela before Chavez liberated them
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and other victim brother peoples around the world and (3) the allies of the US, who are divided
into fools and powerful allies.
The conductor describes the US’s insistence in harming Venezuela and the Venezuelan
people’s moral strength and capacity to resist, and uses Obama as the prototypical villain:
(07:10) “Obama launches a sort of national emergency. ... They want us to give up
by deterrence. [They] try to make us abandon our impregnable will of following up
on Chávez’s idea. And we tell them, ‘We have a problem in our spine that does not
allow us to bend our knees.’ We respond with Bolívar’s words: ‘only through
rebellion can a people attain freedom and through freedom can a people be
powerful’”
Venezuelans are strong and ferocious, they are the heroes:
“This a ferocious people, this is the people of Chávez, the people of Bolívar, the
people of Sucre, the people of Manuelita Saenz, the people of Atanasio Girardot,
the people of Ricaute [heroes from the independence period of the nineteenth
century], the people of El Che, the people of Fidel Cartro [independence heroes of
contemporary revolutionary history]” (05:55).
The program conductor mentions the prototypes of allies within the Venezuelan opposition
by calling their names: (06:05) “It is wonderful, Mr. Ledezma, if you are watching us, Leopoldo
López, Capriles Radonsky, Maria Corina Machado, you are the Corinthians.” The commentator
presents these public figures from the political opposition as prototypical characters representing
the internal enemies, who help the US. The Venezuelan opponent type of person is then based on
them. He continues to indicate how opposition people have no faith in the relevance of the
revolution, and that makes them fools: (07:30). “Even if some people in the opposition may say,
‘Obama, Obama!’ [with dismay] do you think Obama is going to pay any attention to Maduro?
Maduro is a midget in diplomacy” implying that they do not understand the strength of Maduro.
The Venezuelan opposition represents a group of foolish allies to the US. A commentator asks:
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(40:43) “Do you see a war scenario, like the one you are describing with your tale
especially about Lybia, Syria and Iraq in Venezuela? And what is your opinion
about those Venezuelans that are perhaps in the US, whom we have seen in recent
days, protesting in front of the OAS offices…who are maybe full of political thirst
and emotion, because Obama ventures with this type of announcement, like the one
he uttered today [referring to the US Executive Order].
Chaderton answers:
(41:12) Well, those people that protested in front of the OAS have caused me
serious trouble, maybe I will open an inquiry about them with Jorge Rodriguez,
who is a psychiatrist. Because in the morning when I arrived to the debate about
Panama, the one we won 29 runs to 3, the young people, little daddy’s boys and
girls that were there, some of the girls were very pretty, by the way [laughs], they
were waiting for us and screamed at me “fascist, fascist!” And I thought, they are
calling me a fascist? And yes, they were talking to me! With that identity problem,
I went into the debate and I don’t know how we managed to make it go well,
because I was beside myself. Then, when I came out, they scream at me again:
“murderer, murderer!” This is so naïve, I would even say they had a certain
lightness which makes me think that they are like robotic youth, so poisoned that
they believe anything you may tell them….Those young people pee themselves out
emotion when they see a gringo.”
It is implied that the Venezuelan opposition is ignorant and not worthy of respect. Saying that he
may open an inquiry about them with Jorge Rodriguez who is a Chavista politician but also a
psychiatrist is an ironic phrase referring to their madness. Also, making reference to the young
women’s beauty, calling them daddy’s boys and girls, robotic youth who pee themselves when
they see a gringo, serves to construct a “type” of person. He is implying that the people who
participate in the student movement: are rich spoiled and alienated fools. This is again a reference
to the student protests of 2014. Chaderton clowns and degrades (Klapp 1954) the youth of the
opposition. Klapp says about clowning the fool that
If the treatment of the fool is gentler than that of the villain, this is only because he
is regarded as too silly or senseless to mean what he does or accomplish his aims;
but he is nonetheless an offender against norms of propriety, and hence is a sufferer
of comic justice. (1954:61)
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So two types of allies are clearly distinguished in the tales told in the interview: (1)
powerful people, especially from the media (the media axis) but also from political factions in
other countries (the Chilean left) that act as accomplices to the US, and (2) the fools, who are
Venezuelans inside Venezuela or living in the US who are ignorant and blinded by capitalism,
represented by the specific political figures mentioned in minute 6:05 as the Corinthians and the
young ignorant, snobbish and spoiled pretty boys and girls from the student movement.
As Zerubavel (1999) argued, the meaning of a given symbolic code derives from its
relationship to other symbolic codes. So in this case, the US villain is contrasted in relation to the
symbolic codes of it allies, some of which are powerful and some of which are just fools.
Chaderton declares, (35:30) “The US is the greatest violator of human rights in the world.
… Their judicial system is history,” yet he adds that the international press [the allies] would never
denounce these violations in the way they would denounce violations in other countries like
Venezuela because there is “a network of complicity” (37:15), that is, a network of allies. The
level of credibility of this statement made by Chaderton contrasts with the credibility Chávez may
have had back in September 2006, when he said at the 61st Assembly of the United Nations, in
New York City that Bush had left a smell of Sulphur in the podium. At the time of Chaderton’s
interview the Venezuelan government had been accused of grave violations of human rights and
corruption scandals and the “hierarchy of credibility” (Loseke 2010:35) of revolutionary
politicians was significantly lower.
According the Zúquete (2008), Hugo Chávez sacralized himself and the political project
by using religious metaphors, he made himself out to be a hero comparable to a god. For Galbán
and Molero de Cabeza (2008), on the other hand, the main rhetorical characteristics of his narrative
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was the warlike metaphorical articulation, by which he made himself a hero comparable to a
liberator like Simon Bolivar was. What is clear, however, is that his role as the uncontestable
political leader of the revolution was boosted by his rhetoric which he used to position himself as
the prototypical hero of the revolution. The deed of demonizing Bush with a humorous remark in
an international official space, without any apparent negative consequences (no official sanctions
were issued), added to the construction of him as a “hero” of the resistance against the threat of
the US villain in the international arena. The interconnection of the symbolic code of US villain
and the emotion code of anger and disrespect made by a hero of resistance was, in this case
successful, turning this incident into a widespread cultural reference.
Many of the circulating images of the US villain in the narrative of the Venezuelan
government today have their origins in the use of the codes of Hugo Chávez. Current Venezuelan
actors like Roy Chaderton imitate constantly the ironic and warlike rhetoric of Chávez’s narrative,
but they may not succeed in become prototypes of heroes themselves due to changes in the political
sphere like the human rights violations of 2014 during the student protests. The sort of symbolic
connections that new Venezuelan political actors create may not be using sufficiently expanded
socially circulating narratives in the Venezuela post-Chavez. For instance, in this interview, Roy
Chaderton constructs a fictional story of a US invasion and describes with irony the foolish
characteristics of some internal allies of the US, as exemplified earlier. He uses Chávez’s
vocabulary, “escuálidos” (the word means “scrawny” in English, and it is a term Chávez used for
opposition members) and “chavistas.” He makes an ironic joke and resorts to a warlike rhetoric to
refer to the opposition as fools. Chaderton establishes the premise that a Venezuelan oppositor
could be foolish enough to ask the US for an invasion but would in the process be killed as well.
The joke ends as follows:
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Those who would hurt us would not have pity on anyone. Besides, bombs do not
have identification devices for political militancy of any type. Bombs are generous
because they share harm equally with everything they come into contact with. Guns
fulfill the same purpose, and snipers always point to heads. But a time arrives when
the head of an “escualido” is not any different from the head of a Chavista, except
for its content. The sound produced by an escualido’s head is quieter—it’s like a
click—because the cranial space is empty.
The problem with this particular metaphor is that by the time it was used, students of the opposition
had actually been shot in the head during the student protests of 2014 by armed law enforcement
agents of the Venezuelan government. Until Chávez’s death, broadly known accusations against
his government had to do, mostly, with acts of corruption, institutional deterioration, and technical
incapacity, but not with violations of human rights. When Chavez made remarks like this, it was
not as easy to associate them with concrete violations of human rights within Venezuela. The
construction of the prototypical fool could have been effective if Chavez had said something like
this. But Chaderton’s use of irony here trying to relate the symbolic code of an external enemy to
the symbolic code of an internal foolish type of person does cannot escape to the socially
circulating knowledge of the visible human rights violations committed by the government after
Chavez’s death.
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CONCLUSIONS

For Eakin (2006), narrative is not only the container of a story but actually the reflection
of lived experience. The collective emotional experience of Chavism sustained the group identity
while the revolutionary process was inspired by the charismatic leader. However, today, although
the leader’s narrative is being constantly imitated, perhaps to try to reaffirm a collective identity,
the bureaucratized revolutionary leaders do not seem to have the same “emotional attachment”
(Shamir et al. 1993) with their audience.
Perhaps the group identity of Chavismo, which was central to the original nation-making
processes inspired by Chavez, can no longer exist in the dramatic conditions of socioeconomic and
sociopolitical crisis the country is going through. The death of Hugo Chávez may not have
represented the death of a warlike and religious rhetoric, and a melodramatic narrative with pure
evil and pure good, but it may have been the end of emotional communion among Venezuelans
that could have lost faith in political project that uses more rhetoric resources to sustain power than
effective social action.
Using elements of the leader’s narrative will not restore popular support to his successors.
A bureaucratized Revolutionary Government does not represent the prototype of holy warrior hero.
On the other hand, minor diplomatic sanctions like the US executive order against specific
individuals accused of corruption does not represent a major source of national security concerns.
To reinstate Chavismo as a national identity and to restore an emotional connection between the
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people and the government regime would require more than a symbolic interaction based on the
figure of a dead leader.
The anti-American narrative, in the post-Chávez Venezuela may not be effective to
influence mass audiences if the villain does not offer further elements to make a stronger
association between the symbolic code villain and the emotion code of hatred. Theoretical tools of
analysis like symbolic codes and narrative can be very valuable instruments to ask empirical
questions regarding the moral grounds upon which problematical political behavior is based.
The understanding of the symbolic universe of a people, their ideas about how the world
works or should work, is required for effective political propaganda. In this regard, Zeruvabel’s
(1999) distinction between indicators and symbols gains importance. Perhaps what makes a
socially constructed connection between a signifier and signified to create an effective symbolic
code is its proximity to being perceived as an indicator. In other words, the more a symbolic code
seems to be naturally attached to an emotion code the more effective it will be.
The fact that in Latin America, the symbolic code of the US villain constitutes a socially
circulating narrative traditionally effective for counterhegemonic movement mobilization
(Ferreira Navarro 2014) it may not be enough to serve now as a “historical narrative” (Zeruvabel
1999:68). In other words, it may not be a strong enough symbol to serve as the milestone for the
current historical narrative considering that it competes with other historical narratives such as
corruption scandals of counterhegemonic governments still in power also known for very recent
human rights violations.
If social groups follow systems of meanings and identify emotions as appropriate or
inappropriate and will establish systems of loyalty for its members based on the degree to they
must obey the code, then understanding the operationalization of such systems of obedience is
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crucial to understanding social groups. As seen in the theoretical discussion, emotional
vocabularies and syntax are key aspects of these operationalizations. Understanding meaning
making in collective emotional experience requires asking questions about historical, cultural, and
political contexts. When grave sociopolitical crisis emerge and democratic practices are threatened
it is important to understand what factors contribute to the prolongation and reinforcement or
rejection and termination of obedience to the dominant political forces.
The data in this study shows a prominent Venezuelan political actor who belongs to the
political force in power use, on the state television channel use a vocabulary and syntax that could,
under different circumstances, create an emotional experience of outrage with serious practical
consequences. However, the sociopolitical situation is such that such types of vocabularies and
syntax are used regularly without drastic practical consequences. The melodramatic narrative has
dominated the political narrative to such degree that the hyperbolic division between good and evil
no longer seems to be impactful. Behind such a desensitization lies a moral mesh that needs to be
empirically observed if the melodrama is to be controlled. Pure heroes, villains and fools can only
serve a political tools to hide shades of gray where deeper social problems may be found and
addressed sensibly. Simplifications of types of persons can only lead to very dangerous
simplifications of types of solutions. A country with a crisis as deep as that of Venezuela can only
benefit from analytical efforts seeking to dismantle the simplifications that its political narrative
has fallen into.
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